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The role of family involvement on CEO turnover : evidence from colombian family firms

dc.contributor.authorGonzález Ferrero, Maximilianospa
dc.contributor.authorGuzmán Vásquez, Alexanderspa
dc.contributor.authorPombo Vejarano, Carlosspa
dc.contributor.authorTrujillo Dávila , María Andreaspa
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-21T22:23:10Z
dc.date.available2023-06-21T22:23:10Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.issn0964-8410
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10726/5117
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd
dc.subjectCorporate Governance
dc.subjectFamily Firms
dc.subjectCEO Turnover
dc.subjectAgency Theory
dc.subjectEmerging Markets
dc.titleThe role of family involvement on CEO turnover : evidence from colombian family firmseng
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.localAcceso Restringido
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESA
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/
dc.description.abstractenglishManuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue We analyze CEO turnover in closely held firms with some level of ownership dispersion in a context of low investor protection. In particular, we examine the impact of family involvement on CEO turnover and CEO turnover/performance sensitivity. We argue that family involvement in management, ownership, and control has both a direct effect on CEO turnover from the family presence itself, and a moderating effect over CEO turnover/performance sensitivity attributable to the agency tensions between majority and minority shareholders (whether other family blocks or non-family shareholders). Research Findings/Insights Using data from 1996–2006 for 523 Colombian firms, we find direct and moderating effects, depending on the type of family involvement. Family involvement in management and boards reduces CEO turnover, but family involvement in ownership increases it. Regarding moderating effects, family involvement in ownership reduces CEO turnover/performance sensitivity, while the opposite occurs with family directors. Theoretical/Academic Implications Our results show that closely held firms in emerging markets exhibit a strong negative CEO turnover/performance sensitivity, which is a somewhat counterintuitive result, and also contribute to a better understanding of agency conflicts within family firms by highlighting the different ways families affect CEO turnover. Practitioner/Policy Implications Our findings suggest that even benevolently entrenched family CEOs are not immune to poor financial performance. Families that are majority or controlling shareholders may support CEOs even when the firm performs poorly because of potential benefits from control. Family boards are very sensitive to financial performance even when the CEO is a family member.eng
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.relation.citationvolume23
dc.relation.citationissue3
dc.relation.citationstartpage266
dc.relation.citationendpage284
dc.contributor.orcidGonzález Ferrero, Maximiliano [0000-0002-8675-6911]
dc.contributor.orcidGuzmán Vásquez, Alexander [0000-0001-7675-048X]
dc.contributor.orcidPombo Vejarano, Carlos [0000-0001-9638-0586]
dc.contributor.orcidTrujillo Dávila, María Andrea [0000-0002-9592-7890]
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.redcolhttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ART
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32
dc.contributor.scopusGonzález Ferrero, Maximiliano [17434254200]
dc.contributor.scopusGuzmán Vásquez, Alexander [55207224400]
dc.contributor.scopusPombo Vejarano, Carlos [6603836065]
dc.contributor.scopusTrujillo Dávila, María Andrea [55206416700]
dc.description.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-8675-6911
dc.description.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-7675-048X
dc.description.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-9638-0586
dc.description.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-9592-7890
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=17434254200
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55207224400
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=6603836065
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55206416700
dc.identifier.eissn1467-8683
dc.relation.ispartofjournalCorporate Governance: An International Review
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12083
dc.rights.coarhttp://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/


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