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Governance of family firms

dc.contributor.authorVillalonga, Belénspa
dc.contributor.authorAmit, Raphaelspa
dc.contributor.authorTrujillo Dávila , María Andreaspa
dc.contributor.authorGuzmán Vásquez, Alexanderspa
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-21T22:23:10Z
dc.date.available2023-06-21T22:23:10Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.issn1941-1367
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10726/5116
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherAnnual Reviews
dc.titleGovernance of family firmseng
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.localAcceso Restringido
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESA
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/
dc.description.abstractenglishWe review what the financial economics literature has to say about the unique ways in which the following three classic agency problems manifest themselves in family firms: (a) shareholders versus managers, (b) controlling (family) shareholders versus noncontrolling shareholders, and (c) shareholders versus creditors. We also call attention to a fourth agency problem that is unique to family firms: the conflict of interest between family shareholders and the family at large, which can be thought of as the “superprincipal” in a multi-tier agency structure akin to those found in other concentrated ownership structures in which the controlling owner is the state, a bank, a corporation, or other institutions. We then discuss the solutions or corporate governance mechanisms that have been devised to address these problems and what research has taught us about these mechanisms' effectiveness at solving these four conflicts in family firms.eng
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.relation.citationvolume7
dc.relation.citationissue1
dc.relation.citationstartpage635
dc.relation.citationendpage654
dc.contributor.orcidTrujillo Dávila, María Andrea [0000-0002-9592-7890]
dc.contributor.orcidGuzmán Vásquez, Alexander [0000-0001-7675-048X]
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.redcolhttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ART
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32
dc.contributor.scopusVillalonga, Belén [6506527390]
dc.contributor.scopusAmit, Raphael [7004998175]
dc.contributor.scopusTrujillo Dávila, María Andrea [55206416700]
dc.contributor.scopusGuzmán Vásquez, Alexander [55207224400]
dc.description.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-9592-7890
dc.description.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-7675-048X
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=6506527390
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=7004998175
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55206416700
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55207224400
dc.identifier.eissn1941-1375
dc.relation.ispartofjournalAnnual Review of Financial Economics
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034357
dc.subject.proposalAgency theory
dc.subject.proposalCorporate governance
dc.subject.proposalFamily firms
dc.subject.proposalControl
dc.subject.proposalMinority shareholders
dc.rights.coarhttp://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/


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