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dc.contributor.authorBradford, Henryspa
dc.contributor.authorGuzmán Vásquez, Alexanderspa
dc.contributor.authorRestrepo, José Manuelspa
dc.contributor.authorTrujillo Dávila , María Andreaspa
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-21T22:23:06Z
dc.date.available2023-06-21T22:23:06Z
dc.date.issued2018-05
dc.identifier.issn0018-1560
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10726/5091
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer Dordrecht
dc.subjectUniversity governance
dc.subjectBalance of power
dc.subjectAssemblies
dc.subjectBoards
dc.subjectNon-profit organizations
dc.titleWho controls the board in non-profit organizations? The case of private higher education institutions in Colombiaeng
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.localAbierto (Texto Completo)
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESA
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/
dc.description.abstractenglishHow should the governance system in a non-membership non-profit organization be designed? This organizational form has no shareholders; instead, donors provide funds. Thus, at the organizational level, the board of directors could have all the power. Under this legal form, who controls the board? If too powerful, boards could misuse resources or distract the organization from its foundational goals. We examine the case of private higher education institutions (HEIs) in Colombia and the balance of power in university governance systems which feature this organizational form. Most HEIs in our sample have a kind of assembly of representatives as the governance body with the highest authority and able to appoint and control the board. We specifically discuss the assemblies’ reason for being, structure, and functions in private HEIs in Colombia. We analyze a total of 204 HEI governance structures and find governance arrangements with the characteristics of an assembly of representatives in 154 (75.9%). Our analysis highlights features in some of these governance bodies that could lead to overly powerful assemblies (e.g., founder donors with tenure for life). Clearly, a proper balance of power is required to avoid rent-seeking behaviors or the pursuit of harmful private non-monetary benefits from assembly members as well as boards.eng
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.relation.citationvolume75
dc.relation.citationissue5
dc.relation.citationstartpage909
dc.relation.citationendpage924
dc.contributor.orcidGuzmán Vásquez, Alexander [0000-0001-7675-048X]
dc.contributor.orcidTrujillo Dávila, María Andrea [0000-0002-9592-7890]
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.redcolhttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ART
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32
dc.contributor.scopusBradford, Henry [57194281308]
dc.contributor.scopusGuzmán Vásquez, Alexander [55207224400]
dc.contributor.scopusRestrepo, José Manuel [57195253478]
dc.contributor.scopusTrujillo Dávila, María Andrea [55206416700]
dc.description.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-7675-048X
dc.description.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-9592-7890
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=57194281308
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55207224400
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=57195253478
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55206416700
dc.identifier.eissn1573-174X
dc.relation.ispartofjournalHigher Education
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-017-0177-2
dc.rights.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2


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