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Is board turnover driven by performance in family firms?

dc.contributor.authorGonzález Ferrero, Maximilianospa
dc.contributor.authorGuzmán Vásquez, Alexanderspa
dc.contributor.authorPablo, Eduardospa
dc.contributor.authorTrujillo Dávila , María Andreaspa
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-21T22:23:06Z
dc.date.available2023-06-21T22:23:06Z
dc.date.issued2019-04
dc.identifier.issn0275-5319
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10726/5089
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier Inc.
dc.titleIs board turnover driven by performance in family firms?eng
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.localAcceso Restringido
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESA
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/
dc.description.abstractenglishWe study director turnover as a corporate governance mechanism in family firms; specifically, the effect that family involvement in management, ownership, and control has on director turnover (direct effect) and on director turnover-performance sensitivity (moderating effect). Using a sample of Colombian companies, we find a negative relationship between turnover and firm performance. Additionally, we find that family involvement in management, ownership, and on boards leads to (1) more stable directorships and reduced director turnover and (2) cancellation of the expected director turnover-performance sensitivity. This last result implies that director turnover in firms with family influence is not driven by financial results, which suggests greater (more severe) agency conflicts between controlling families and minority shareholders. Finally, we find that family involvement as indirect ownership through pyramidal control increases director turnover, which suggests the existence of internal markets for directors within business groups.eng
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.relation.citationvolume48
dc.relation.citationstartpage169
dc.relation.citationendpage186
dc.contributor.orcidGonzález Ferrero, Maximiliano [0000-0002-8675-6911]
dc.contributor.orcidGuzmán Vásquez, Alexander [0000-0001-7675-048X]
dc.contributor.orcidPablo, Eduardo [0000-0003-4320-0224]
dc.contributor.orcidTrujillo Dávila, María Andrea [0000-0002-9592-7890]
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.redcolhttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ART
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32
dc.contributor.scopusGonzález Ferrero, Maximiliano [17434254200]
dc.contributor.scopusGuzmán Vásquez, Alexander [55207224400]
dc.contributor.scopusPablo, Eduardo [25643189300]
dc.contributor.scopusTrujillo Dávila, María Andrea [55206416700]
dc.description.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-8675-6911
dc.description.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-7675-048X
dc.description.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-4320-0224
dc.description.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-9592-7890
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=17434254200
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55207224400
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=25643189300
dc.description.scopushttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55206416700
dc.identifier.eissn1878-3384
dc.relation.ispartofjournalResearch in International Business and Finance
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2018.12.002
dc.subject.proposalFamily firms
dc.subject.proposalCorporate governance
dc.subject.proposalDirector turnover
dc.subject.proposalEmerging markets
dc.rights.coarhttp://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/


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